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The recent spate of corporate failures around the world has attracted
considerable attention from corporate regulators and professional bodies.
Although corporate failures are not new, what is of increasing concern to
stakeholders is the unexpected collapse of many apparently financially robust
companies. One of the many victims of these collapses has been the reputation
of audit firms, the audit process, and the accounting profession generally. The
purpose of this paper is to first, outline the importance of audit quality in the
operation of capital markets. Second, to place the issue of audit quality in
context. Third, outline and synthesize prior research on audit quality and
finally, to consider the responses that regulators and the profession can and
should consider based on the available empirical evidence.
Introduction
Recent corporate collapses have led to a number of investigations into the
effectiveness of corporate governance practices and the quality of the audit
process worldwide. In particular, concerns were universally expressed regarding
the reliability of financial reports and the effectiveness of audits. These events
have again focused attention on the reliability of financial reports and the
effectiveness of auditors to warn investors of impending corporate collapse. In
particular, the auditing profession has continued to receive increased attention
from a number of sources around the world.
In Australia, the collapse of HIH Insurance in 2001 led the Federal Government
to establish an inquiry chaired by Professor Ian Ramsay into auditor
independence. Additionally, the draft Bill for the ninth stage of the Corporate
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) proposed a range of measures
designed to enhance the general corporate disclosure framework including
relevant recommendations of the HIH Royal Commission. The Australian Stock
Exchange’s Corporate Governance Council has also issued a report, titled
“Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations”.
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Similarly in the US, in response to the Enron collapse, new regulations have been issued.
On July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted in response to issues
uncovered at Enron, Global Crossing, and other corporations (McGowan and Brisendine
2003). Among other things, the Act (and related SEC proposed regulations) mandates
new limits on accountants who provide opinions on public company financial statements
and adds new corporate governance requirements (McGowan and Brisendine 2003). The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act established an independent review by federal accountants of
accounting firms with more than 100 audit clients (replacing the peer review process),
established an accounting oversight body with the authority to investigate and punish
accounting firms (funded by public corporations and overseen by the SEC), and restricted
the consulting services an audit firm can provide to clients. In the UK, various governance
initiatives have also been undertaken including the issuance of the Combined Code in
2003.
Ramsay (2001) noted that two motivating factors for the review of Australia’s regulations
governing auditor independence are regulatory developments overseas and publicity
surrounding the role of auditors in recent Australian corporate collapses. Similarly, the
US government has indicated dissatisfaction with the profession’s self-regulation as
practiced in the years leading up to the Enron collapse. It is clear from such moves that
there has been considerable dissatisfaction at a number of levels with contemporary
corporate governance practices and the roles of auditors and auditing.
Auditing is considered to be one of a number of institutional and market-induced
arrangements relating to shareholder/manager conflicts. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
indicate that auditing derives value from its role in reducing information asymmetries by
providing external verification of the reliability of a firm’s financial statements. The
effectiveness of this external monitoring is dependent on audit quality. It is, therefore, the
nature of a high quality audit which makes audit services valuable. High quality audits
result in reliable financial information for capital markets, which is essential if capital
markets are to function efficiently. Without high quality audits, the quality of financial
information available to external financial report users is likely to deteriorate. Audit quality
can therefore play an important role in the effective allocation of scarce economic resources
through its role in capital markets.
In considering the importance of audit quality in producing reliable financial information,
Monroe and Tan (1997, p. 37) point out that according to Ettredge, Shane and Smith
(1988), accounting information that is produced in conjunction with a high quality audit is
better able to reflect a company’s specific economic circumstances, and that this may
affect future cash flows. Further, they note that Dopuch and Simunic (1980) have indicated
that “ a costly audit by a credible auditor can either signal management’s honesty to
investors or reduce agency costs by restricting top management’s ability to conceal,
through misrepresentation in the financial statements, the consequence of actions taken
in the best interests of top management (self-serving behaviour) but not shareholders”.
Monroe and Tan (1997, p. 38) therefore, conclude that “the quality of an audit can affect
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the reliability of audited financial information, which in turn plays an important role in
capital markets”.
Ramsay (2001, p. 103) reports that any lack of confidence by the financial markets in the
integrity of financial statements “can engender fear and a reluctance to invest, to the
detriment of the economy”. As indicated by Coffee (2001, p. 2), without high quality
audits “it is reasonable to believe that market efficiency would be lower and the cost of
capital higher”. In a similar vein, Wallman (1995, p. 81) has commented that “without
accountants to ensure the quality and integrity of financial information, the markets for
capital would be far less efficient, the cost of capital would be higher and our standard of
living would be lower”. Clearly then, the quality of the audit process is one of a number of
matters that are fundamental in providing the required confidence participants in financial
markets require.
Audit Quality in Context
DeAngelo (1981a) has developed a demand and supply rationale for audit quality and
provides a frequently cited definition of audit quality. Audit quality in this context is
defined as the probability that an auditor will both discover a breach in the accounting
system and further report the breach. The discovery of a misstatement measures quality
in terms of the auditor’s knowledge and ability, whilst the reporting of a misstatement is
dependent upon the auditor’s incentives to disclose.
The probability that an auditor will detect a breach depends largely on the probability of
discovery, which is related to the auditors’ competence. Similarly, the probability that an
auditor will report the detected breach is related to the auditors’ independence. In essence,
in order to create a demand, or increase the demand for auditing, auditors have to convince
the market that they can detect breaches and are in a position to report them. Viewed from
this perspective, audit quality has two components, namely, detection of contract breaches
and disclosure of contract breaches. Audit quality is, therefore, dependent upon the
auditors’ ability to avoid both detection error and disclosure error.
In a similar vein, Herrbach (2001) indicates that the existence and justification of auditing
is largely dependent on two sets of factors exhibited by auditors, namely, technical quality
and professional behaviour. Herrbach (2001) points out that any reduction in the care and
scepticism involved in auditing (technical quality) can directly threaten the outcome of
the audit engagement and therefore the validity of the audit opinion. Similarly the
preservation of a high level of apparent “professionalism” (professional behaviour) is
also an important aspect in the social image of auditing. Herrbach (2001) concludes,
therefore, that apparent auditor behaviour is as important as technical competence with
regard to audit quality, particularly since auditor behaviour is more visible. Figure 1 below
from Herrbach (2001) outlines these relationships.
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Herrbach (2001) indicates that at the macro level, the recognition of audit quality by the
economic environment is particularly important to the long-term survival of audit firms.
Significantly, the future of the profession now more than ever, given recent corporate
debacles, depends on its ability to assert and legitimize the value of audit methodologies
and outcomes. At the micro level, audit quality is a fundamental element in the competitive
market for audit services. Moizer (1997), for example, points out the reputational impact of
audit quality perceptions on the structure of the market for audit services.
Whilst the DeAngelo definition of audit quality has been widely quoted, it has also been
criticized as not being broad enough and as a consequence, does not therefore, provide
a full definition for audit quality. Sutton (1993) has observed that whilst a considerable
number of studies have examined issues concerned with audit quality, no single generally
accepted definition of audit quality has yet emerged. Sutton (1993) concludes that the
reason for the absence of a single definition of audit quality is due to the apparent
conflicting roles of participants in the audit market. Moizer (1986) notes that diversity in
the measurement of audit quality necessarily requires any definition of audit quality to
utilize a combination of both outcome and process measures.  Reisch (2000) attributes the
absence of a single measure of audit quality to the fact that it is a “multidimensional latent
construct” and is, therefore, somewhat difficult to measure.
Audit quality, however, is characterised by strong ambiguity that makes it hard to
demonstrate. Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen (1998), for example, indicate that the
measurement of audit quality is problematic, both intrinsically and for financial statement
users. In other areas of economic activity, it is possible to develop objective and precise
criteria to measure quality, however, this is not the case for audit quality.  As a result, the
extant literature relating to audit quality reflects this situation and includes multiple
measures of audit quality.
Figure 1:  The Duality of Audit Quality
Hardly Visible
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Prior Research into Audit Quality
There is a vast literature relating to audit quality and to the measurement of audit quality.
Audit quality has been examined from a differential pricing viewpoint, for example Simunic
(1980); Francis (1984); Palmrose (1986); Francis and Simon (1987); Simon and Francis
(1988); Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) and Colbert and Murray (1998).
Audit quality has also been studied by using surrogates for audit quality in order to
consider audit quality differences between accounting firms for example (Dopuch and
Simunic (1980); Nichols and Smith (1983); Simunic and Stein (1987); Palmrose (1988);
Ettredge, Shane and Smith (1988); Wyer, White and Janson (1988); Eichenseher et al.
(1989); Monroe and Tan (1997) and Krishnan and Schauer (2000).
 As previously indicated, despite the extent of that literature, no single generally accepted
definition of audit quality has emerged, nor any single generally accepted measure. Much
of the audit quality literature derives from DeAngelo’s (1981a) frequently cited definition
of audit quality.
Whilst the DeAngelo (1981a) definition of audit quality is probably the most widely
quoted in the literature, Krishnan and Schauer (2000) have indicated that, as they believe
that both aspects of the DeAngelo (1981a) definition are unobservable, researchers have
taken one of two approaches to measuring audit quality in empirical work: a direct and an
indirect approach.
Firstly, audit quality has been measured utilising a more direct approach and is based on
the assumption that the probability of discovery and reporting of contract breaches will
be reflected in features of the audit such as errors made by auditors. Examples of studies
using the direct approach in relation to auditor errors are Brown and Raghunandan (1995)
and Colbert and Murray (1998), both of which used the outcomes of peer review programs
to investigate audit quality. Examples of studies using a direct approach in relation to
financial statement outcomes include Balsam et al. (2003) (abnormal accruals) and Krishnan
(2003) (valuation of earnings surprises). Because of their focus on outcomes of the audit
process, these studies view audit quality from an ex-post perspective.
Secondly, audit quality has been measured in an indirect way by looking at correlates of
audit quality. Research using the indirect approach is of two types, both of which consider
assessment of audit quality from an ex-ante perspective. The first type measures audit
quality using surrogates of, or proxies for, quality. The second indirect approach assesses
audit quality by examining the attributes or factors perceived to be associated with audit
quality by parties involved in, or affected by, the audit process and audit reports. Studies
of this type are also referred to as adopting a behavioural perspective on audit quality.
The next section will review both types of studies that measure audit quality in an indirect
way.
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Surrogate studies of audit quality
Sutton (1993) observes that studies that have attempted to measure audit quality using
surrogates have focussed on external measures of audit quality since audit market
participants are generally unable to observe audit quality directly. Consequently, results
of these studies have identified a number of audit firm quality factors important in
assessments of audit quality. The principal factors investigated in surrogate studies of
audit quality include audit firm size, litigation experience, auditor reputation, auditor tenure,
the provision of non-audit services, audit structure and industry experience. Each of
these factors is discussed in the order below.
Audit Firm Size
The most commonly used surrogate for audit quality is audit firm size (e.g., Dopuch and
Simunic, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981a; Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987;
Menon and Williams, 1991; Simunic and Stein, 1987; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Craswell et al.,
1995; Colbert and Murray, 1997; Morris and Strawser, 1999; Krishnan and Schauer, 2000).
It has been argued that firm size is an effective surrogate for audit quality because it
“proxies for the magnitude of the firms’ client-specific quasi-rents” (DeAngelo, 1981a)
DeAngelo (1981a) proposed that larger audit firms receive fee premiums because they
have a greater reputation at stake and that reputation, together with their more substantial
client base, provides them with the incentive to be more independent, leading to higher
audit quality. Simunic and Stein (1987), on the other hand, assert that larger audit firms are
better than smaller audit firms at detecting errors because they have greater resources at
their disposal and can attract employees with superior skills and experience. Consequently,
larger firms are able to conduct their audits to a higher standard than smaller firms.
Although the findings of some studies have not supported the audit firm size/audit
quality association (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Nichols and Smith, 1983; Wyer, Whyte and Janson,
1988), generally speaking, most studies have shown that larger audit firms receive higher
audit fees than smaller audit firms, although whether the fee premium is attributable to
higher audit quality is not resolved empirically. The weight of evidence therefore, both
theoretical and empirical, supports the association such that audit firm size is now generally
accepted as being closely associated with, and representative of, audit quality.
Litigation experience
A number of researchers have investigated audit firm litigation experience as a surrogate
for audit quality. Latham and Linville (1998) indicate that such studies have examined
either client and auditor characteristics involved in auditor litigation or auditor behaviour
such as client screening and audit portfolio decisions, and changes in audit quality
motivated by changes in the civil liability environment. The results of these studies
demonstrate product differentiation by Big N audit firms1 and that they are suppliers of
high quality audit services.
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Palmrose (1988), for example, used auditor litigation as a surrogate for audit quality,
arguing that litigation reflects audit failure and, hence, reflects audit quality. Palmrose
(1988) found evidence of quality differences between Big N and non-Big N firms, specifically
that Big N auditors were less likely to be involved as defendants in audit litigation. Based
on the assumption that a higher (lower) quality auditor is involved in less (more) audit
litigation, the results of Palmrose (1988) are consistent with the contention that “Big”
audit firms are higher quality suppliers of audit services than smaller firms.
Auditor Reputation
Auditor reputation has been used as a surrogate for audit quality in a variety of studies,
including fee studies, studies of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of shares, and studies of
the stock market effects associated with auditor change (Moizer, 1997). Each type of
study assumes that there is an observable economic result from the employment of an
audit firm with a high reputation. This assumption is based on economic theory that firms
have an incentive to incur higher costs in order to produce a higher quality service (Klein
and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983) and that consumers will recognise this and be prepared to
pay higher fees, or accord other economic benefits, in order to receive a higher quality
service. In other words, audit firm fees or other economic benefits, are determined by
audit firm reputation.
The empirical evidence from the three types of studies reviewed by Moizer (1997) generally
supports the association between auditor reputation and audit quality. The results of
audit fee studies have generally found that an audit fee premium exists for the Big N audit
firms (Moizer, 1997). The IPO studies generally conclude that Big N firms have a
reputational effect manifested in IPOs associated with those firms gaining a higher level
of initial returns. Finally, auditor change studies have generally found that shares in
companies that changed from non-Big N firms to Big N ones tended to have better stock
market performance (e.g., Johnson and Lys, 1990; Eichenseher, Hagigi and Shields, 1989).
Auditor Tenure
Auditor tenure has been regarded as a surrogate for audit quality with the association
between the two being explained by either a regulatory or economic argument (Geiger and
Raghunandan, 2002). The regulatory argument, going back to Mautz and Sharaf (1961) is
that the longer the tenure of an audit firm with a particular client, the closer the identification
of the firm with the client management’s interests and the greater the impairment of
auditor independence and audit quality.
The economic argument (DeAngelo, 1981b) is that audit independence is likely to be
impaired in the early years of tenure because of the practice of “low-balling” (pricing the
initial audit fee below cost) in order to obtain a client. That the practice of “low-balling”
exists has been well demonstrated both empirically (e.g., Simon and Francis, 1988) and
experimentally (e.g., Schatzberg et al, 1987). Given that auditors will seek to maintain
newly acquired clients long enough to recoup initial losses, audit independence and,
therefore, audit quality may be impaired in the early years of audit tenure.
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A number of studies have also considered the issue of auditor tenure and audit quality in
the context of calls for mandatory auditor rotation. Although there are theoretical arguments
to associate tenure with beneficial and adverse effects, the empirical evidence from studies
such as Myers, Myers and Thomas (2003) suggests that the longer the tenure the more
beneficial this will be in relation to auditor independence and audit quality.
Provision of Non-Audit Services
The provision of non-audit services (NAS) has also been associated with audit quality.
The provision of NAS has long been regarded by corporate regulators in Australia and
elsewhere as a threat to audit independence and, hence, audit quality.
Empirical evidence on the effect of NAS on auditor independence and audit quality is
mixed. For example, in Australia, Wines (1994) found a negative association between NAS
and qualified audit opinions, indicating the potential for an independence problem in the
presence of NAS. By contrast, Barkess and Simnett (1994) and Craswell (1999) found no
evidence that NAS poses a threat to auditor independence.
In the US, Elstein (2001) found that large fees generated from NAS negatively affect
auditor independence and audit quality. Similarly Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002)
obtained a compelling set of results against NAS indicating that firms with higher NAS
are associated with more earnings management, i.e. larger abnormal accruals. By contrast,
Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew (2003), Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Reynolds, Deis
and Francis (2004) found no evidence to suggest that NAS impair audit quality.
While the empirical evidence is unclear, what is clear is that corporate regulators world-
wide, and many other stakeholders, consider NAS a threat to independence. This view
has been reinforced recently by spectacular corporate collapses and apparent audit failures
associated with them.
Audit Structure
Audit structure has also been examined as a surrogate for audit quality. Cushing and
Loebbecke (1986, p. 32) classified audit approaches as highly structured, semi-structured,
partially structured and unstructured, and defined a structured audit approach as
“characterised by a prescribed, logical sequence of procedures, decisions and
documentation steps, and by a comprehensive and integrated set of audit policies and
tools designed to assist the auditor in conducting the audit”. Structured audit approaches
have been seen as a response to the increasing complexity of the business environment,
increasing regulation, threats to the legitimacy of the auditing profession, the threat of
litigation, and the apparent shortcomings of unaided auditor judgments (Bowrin, 1998).
With respect to audit quality, Carcello, Hermanson and Huss (1996) argue that a structured
audit methodology promotes greater efficiency and effectiveness when used for structured
and semi-structured audit tasks. There is also evidence that the structured audit approach
enables audit firms to exercise greater control over audit task performance, and may
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provide human resource benefits by reducing job stress and staff turnover (e.g., Ashton
and Willingham, 1989; Dirsmith and McAllister, 1982). By contrast, Francis (1984) argues
that imposing structure is reductionist and that firms adopting such an approach assume
audit tasks can be simplified and standardised, whereas evidence suggests that many
audit tasks are non-routine and demand less standardisation rather than more. Similarly,
Dirsmith and Haskins (1991) found that auditors in firms with an unstructured audit
approach used more factors in assessing risk relative to auditors in firms with structured
approaches. The implication is that structured audit approaches may have a negative
impact on audit quality.
Industry Experience
Industry experience is a further factor that has been suggested as implicated in assessments
of audit quality. Firms with multiple clients in the same industry may be argued to have a
greater appreciation of the audit risks unique to that industry. Conversely, firms with few
clients in an industry may not have the incentive or ability to keep up-to-date with
changes and new developments in the industry. Solomon et al. (1999) indicate that industry
experts have more experience and make better audit judgements. Hogan and Jeter (1995)
also support this link between industry experience and audit quality arguing that firms
with industry specialisation have financial savings and gains in audit quality. So too do
Dies and Giroux (1992) who argued that firms with a higher concentration of clients in a
particular industry will provide greater audit quality because they have the opportunity
to earn a reputation for servicing that industry. Because that reputation is of value to
audit firms in the form of higher audit fees, there is an economic incentive to protect their
reputation by providing higher quality audits.
Behavioural Studies of Audit Quality
Unlike studies that have utilized surrogate measures for audit quality, which represent
outcome measures, Sutton (1993, p. 90) indicates that the behavioural studies are based
on process measures of audit quality and that “the ultimate measure of quality is made by
the consumer of the product” i.e., based on historical performance. Process measures
enable the producer to rectify weaknesses in the process so that outcome quality can be
improved. Consequently, results of the behavioural studies have revealed that, in addition
to audit firm attributes, a number of audit team attributes are also important in assessments
of audit quality.
The surrogate studies of audit quality discussed in the previous section typically examine
only one surrogate in each study. By contrast, the behavioural studies, which examine
perceptions of attributes or factors associated with audit quality, typically examine
combinations of factors considered important in perceptions of audit quality.
Given that the behavioural studies examine a combination factors, it is not possible to
review these studies in the same way as the surrogate studies, i.e. on an attribute-by-
attribute basis. The review of the literature in this area will be limited to the more significant
behavioural studies, although other behavioural studies are also referred to as appropriate.
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Shockley (1981) investigated the perceived effects of competition, the provision of
management accounting services, audit firm size and tenure on audit independence.
Perceptions of independence were obtained from financial analysts, commercial loan
officers and auditors through an experimental task. The judgments were analyzed using
factorial analysis of variance techniques. The judgments of the three groups were found
to be similar with competition, provision of management accounting services and audit
firm size being significant in judgments of perceptions of audit independence. Audit firm
tenure with a particular client was found not to be significant.
Mock and Samet (1982) identified potential attributes from the literature that are perceived
by financial statement preparers, auditors and users as being related to audit quality. The
study relied upon input from practising auditors and utilized a hierarchical multi-attribute
evaluation model in order to develop a list of attributes that could be used to evaluate
audit quality. The results of the study identified five key audit quality characteristics,
namely, planning, administration, procedures, evaluation and conduct.
Knapp (1985) examined how contextual factors in auditor-client conflicts affect the
perceived ability of auditors to resist management pressure. Four factors, namely, nature
of the conflict issue, client’s financial position, provision of management accounting
services and the degree of competition in the audit market, were identified as hypothesized
to affect users’ perceptions of audit conflict outcomes. The results revealed that commercial
loan officers’ perceptions of the ability of the client to influence the outcome of an
auditor-client conflict increased as the subjectivity in technical standards increased and
the clients’ financial position improved. Additionally, the likelihood of conflict being
resolved in the clients’ favour was only found to be weakly increased through the provision
of management advisory services and competition.
McKinley, Pany and Reckers (1985) undertook a study to investigate whether the provision
of management advisory services by CPA firms, and firm type and size, affect perceptions
of independence. Utilising an experimental task involving the review of a loan application,
261 bank loan officers participated in the study. The results of the study suggest that
bank loan officers believed that financial statements audited by Big N audit firms were
more reliable than those audited by non-Big N firms. Additionally, the loan officers’
confidence that the financial statements were free from fraud increased if the audit firm
also provided management advisory services.
Schroeder, Solomon and Vickery (1986) investigated the perceptions of audit committee
chairpersons and audit partners on factors that are perceived to affect audit quality. They
undertook a survey of audit committee chairpersons of the Fortune 500 and Big N audit
firm partners to determine how they defined audit quality. The participants were asked to
rank 15 factors (six audit team factors and nine firm wide factors) in terms of their importance
to audit quality. The authors concluded that audit team factors (e.g., partner/manager
involvement) were considered as more important in determining audit quality than were
firm wide factors (e.g., quality control factors). Audit partners’ perceptions were generally
consistent with those of the audit committee chairpersons.
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Sutton and Lampe (1990) focused on the development of a more comprehensive measure
of audit quality based on the evaluation of the actual audit process. The study utilized
structured group processes in order to develop an audit quality evaluation model.
Practising auditors were asked to perform a group exercise in order to develop the evaluation
model. The model developed incorporated 19 audit quality attributes classified into the
categories of planning, fieldwork and administration. The evaluation model that was
developed included one measure for each quality attribute.
Knapp (1991) conducted a study that reviewed the factors that audit committee members’
use as surrogates for audit quality. In particular, the effect that the factors of audit firm
size, length of tenure and general audit strategy had on audit committee members’ audit
quality assessments was investigated. Utilizing a case study approach, audit firm size,
length of tenure and general audit strategy were manipulated, and subjects was asked to
estimate the likelihood of the auditor discovering a material error (discovery error) and the
conditional likelihood of requiring management to correct the error or reporting the error
in the audit report (disclosure error). The findings of the study indicated that audit firm
size and length of tenure significantly influence audit committee members’ assessments
of audit quality and, in particular, that length of tenure was significant in regard to discovery
error. Also, audit firm size was significant regarding disclosure error. Audit strategy was
not significant for either discovery or disclosure error.
Carcello, Hermanson and McGrath (1992) attempted to identify the attributes of audit
quality perceived to be important by participants in the financial reporting process. They
utilised a questionnaire of attributes thought to be related to audit quality and sent this to
a sample of auditors, preparers and users of audit services, in order to discover what was
perceived as contributing most to audit quality. All three groups in the sample considered
that characteristics related to members of the audit team (team factors) were more important
to audit quality than characteristics related to the audit firm (firm factors). There were
significant differences between groups regarding individual aspects of audit quality.
Preparers considered responsiveness to client needs to be more important in regard to
audit quality than the other two groups.
Sutton (1993) utilized an approach similar to Mock and Samet (1982) and Sutton and
Lampe (1990). The author used experienced auditors from two international accounting
firms to develop and validate a set of key factors influencing the quality of the audit
process and a set of measures useful in evaluating audit quality. The research method
applied in the study was based on a specialized form of nominal group techniques. The
study identified 19 quality factors within the categories of planning, fieldwork and
administration. Several individual measures were identified for each of the 19 quality
factors. The results indicate that there appears to exist a consensus amongst experienced
auditors on a set of key factors that have an impact on overall audit quality.
Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen (1998) attempted to identify audit quality attributes
from an external user perspective. They observed that a particular characteristic of auditing
is that it is aimed at a heterogeneous group of stakeholders that may have divergent
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interests. This characteristic of the audit market makes it more complicated but nevertheless
just as relevant to determine exactly what users regard as quality. The authors indicate
that prior studies such as Schroeder, Solomon and Vickery (1986) and Knapp (1991) have
considered different stakeholder categories and that a comparison of these studies reveals
that perceptions of audit quality differ between categories. With the exception of Carcello,
Hermanson and McGrath (1992) prior studies have not analysed user heterogeneity.
Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen (1998) therefore, examine how audit quality is perceived
by two external user groups (shareholders and financial journalists). The results of the
study indicate that firstly, external users tend to perceive audit quality attributes as
attributes that also inspire confidence in the auditor. Secondly, whilst a number of different
audit quality dimensions are identified, the dimensions mainly concern moral and ethical
aspects. Finally, respondents assign significantly different values to these quality
dimensions.
Chang and Monroe (2001) extended the work of Knapp (1991) in an Australian environment
by considering additional factors which may have an impact on audit quality and the
impact of those factors on assessments of perceived audit quality. The study investigates
whether auditor reputation, length of auditor-client relationship, audit contract type,
provision/non-provision of non-audit services and the level of fee dependence affect
auditors’, directors’, and creditors’ assessments of perceived audit quality on three
dimensions. Data for the study was obtained via responses to a case study questionnaire
developed originally by Knapp (1991). The results of the study show that all five auditor
characteristics were significant indicating that they affected perceptions of audit quality.
However not all factors affected assessments of audit quality to the same extent. Contract
type, provision of other services and fee dependence were the factors with the most
consistent results across quality measures and subject groups. The results of the study
are of particular importance in that they indicate that there are discrepancies between
perceptions of those who conduct the audit and those who purchase these services.
Duff  (2005) developed an audit quality model using the audit expectations gap and
service quality literature. A survey instrument (AUDITQUAL) consisting of 56 items
relating to audit firm factors, engagement partner factors and audit team factors was
developed. The 56 items were reduced to nine distinct audit quality dimensions and
administered to partners in the 20 largest UK audit firms (representing auditors), finance
directors of UK listed companies (representing financial statement preparers) and fund
managers in the UK (representing external users). The statistical analyses of the data
indicated that the nine audit quality dimensions could be reduced to create two distinct
factors relating to technical quality and service quality. All three groups rated technical
quality dimensions the highest.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
As a result of a number of corporate collapses, the business community and accounting
profession worldwide has recently received attention regarding the effectiveness of
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corporate governance practices and the quality of the audit process. This increased
attention has resulted in a number of investigations and regulatory changes such as,
for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, the UK’s Combined Code and, in
Australia, changes to the Corporations Act following recommendations contained in
CLERP 9.
As a result of these investigations into the effectiveness of corporate governance and
the quality of the audit process, the accounting profession has taken a number of policy
measures to improve audit quality in fact and in appearance. These have included (i) the
profession’s quality assurance program, namely peer review and second partner review,
(ii) recognizing and controlling pressures within public accounting firms that might impact
on audit quality, (iii) strengthening the independence and professionalism of auditors,
and (iv) reinforcing self-regulation. As a specific example, in Australia, Statement of
Auditing Practice AUP 32, “Audit Independence” was issued by the Australian Accounting
Research Foundation (AARF) in 1992 to improve both actual and perceived audit
independence. AUP 32 identified a number of factors that may affect perceptions of audit
independence, including fee dependence, financial involvement, the provision of internal
audit services and the periodic rotation of audit staff among engagements.2
Schelluch and Thorpe (1995) point out, however, that, in instituting such policy measures,
the accounting profession appears to have relied on a priori arguments and normative
assertions regarding factors that can impair actual and perceived audit quality, rather than
on empirical evidence about such factors. Similarly, regulators have all but ignored the
results of academic research in regulatory policy-making. Two recent examples from the
US include the SEC’s proposed ban on audit firms undertaking non-audit services in 2000
and the rapid adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 following Enron’s collapse.
These policy decisions have been made despite the fact that the empirical evidence
regarding the effect of non-audit services on auditor independence is inconclusive and
uncertain. What is certain, however, is that corporate regulators consider non-audit services
to be a significant threat to auditor independence.
To date, there is only limited empirical evidence on the factors that affect perceptions of
audit quality by groups and/or individuals interested in the audit process and audit
reports. Yet, research into perceptions of audit quality is important because it is perceptions
that determine the credibility of the audit report (Shockley, 1981) and have the potential to
erode public confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting system (Pany and
Reckers, 1988). Consequently, gaining understanding of factors that affect perceptions or
assessments of audit quality is important as it can help regulators and the accounting
profession to formulate policy based directly on such factors rather than on a priori
assumptions (Schelluch and Thorpe, 1995). That is, from a practical perspective, such
empirical research will allow regulators and the profession to formulate policies that
effectively address the factors perceived to affect assessments of audit quality by
individuals and/or groups associated with the audit process and audit reports.
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Notes
1. Big N varies in prior studies from Big 8 through to Big 4 currently. Big N is used to
refer generically to this group of firms, except where a specific study of firms is cited.
2. AUP 32 has now been superseded by the Code of Professional Conduct F1
Professional Independence (CPAA and ICAA 2003) from January 1, 2004.
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